Hosted managed-agent terminal retirement

Current gap

A remotely supervised manager can register and serve without holding the space signer. Its typed host authority protocol issues prepare, activate, renew, and session credentials. Terminal managed-agent retirement is different from those standing phases:

• The manager must first revoke the managed actor’s standing mint grant.
• The host must release the lifecycle-owned broker footprint without changing the lifecycle UID or its activation frontier while the actor can still resume.
• Only an explicit terminal request may run the full auth-owned retirement barrier and eventually free the alias.
• A retry must reuse one operation identity so a crash resumes the same barrier.

Deprovisioning the DM and delivery consumers is not terminal retirement. Recreating them for the same UID recaptures the DM frontier and loses pending delivery state. A hosted release therefore keeps the alias and lifecycle resumable. A hosted terminal operation ends that resumability and frees neither footprint nor alias before the barrier confirms.

Narrow seam

Extend the closed remote manager-service authority protocol with one terminal-retirement operation. The request adds:

• one caller-generated requester nkey,
• the exact target owner, actor, and lifecycle UID,
• one operation ID derived from the target lifecycle UID,
• the manager’s current registered serve epoch.

The host derives the authenticated owner from the IdP proof and the manager actors from the registered instance ID. It fresh-checks supervise, the manager lifecycle, the endpoint issuance gate, its principal, and its process epoch. It then returns only a short-lived retirement-requester JWT for that nkey. The JWT is pinned to:

• the server-derived manager serve principal and manager lifecycle UID,
• the exact target lifecycle,
• the auth retirement request and caller reply rails.

The manager uses the existing auth endpoint retirement request. The target stays on the broker-enforced subject. The request carries the lifecycle-derived operation ID and the current registered instance ID and serve epoch. The auth rail recomputes the operation ID from the broker-pinned target before any gate, head, intent, or barrier access, so mint-time validation is not the terminal authorization boundary. No barrier executor, lifecycle head writer, gate writer, signer, profile selector, generic permissions object, or caller-supplied principal crosses the public seam.

Required ordering

The host composition must retain this order:

1. Revoke the managed actor’s standing mint grant.
2. Complete or durably retain the hosted release state without freeing the alias.
3. Mint the target-pinned one-shot retirement requester from the current manager registration.
4. Request the existing auth-owned terminal barrier with the lifecycle-derived operation ID.
5. Remove the hosted survivor record and free the alias only after terminal confirmation.

A failed or uncertain terminal request keeps the alias held. Repeating it uses the same operation ID and target UID.

Bounded regressions

The broker-free authority policy suite should prove:

• only supervise may request terminal authority,
• the terminal request shape is closed,
• the operation ID is derived from the target UID and a different valid ID is refused,
• manager actors and the requester principal are server-derived,
• a missing, retired, foreign-principal, or stale-epoch serve gate refuses issuance,
• the returned JWT grants only the exact target’s retirement request and the caller’s reply rail,
• a different target, manager lifecycle, instance, or epoch cannot reuse the request,
• retries with the same operation ID remain the same terminal operation,
• prepare, activate, renew, and session behavior remains unchanged.

A manager synthetic regression should prove remote teardown asks its injected terminal-authority callback, uses the current serveGrant.epoch, retains the stable UID-derived operation ID, and does not clear its held alias on refusal or uncertainty.